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A “NARROW EXCEPTION” RUN AMOK: HOW COURTS 
HAVE MISCONSTRUED EMPLOYEE-RIGHTS LAWS’ 
EXCLUSION OF “POLICYMAKING” APPOINTEES, AND 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR GETTING BACK ON 
TRACK 
Angela Galloway 
Abstract: The civil rights and workplace protections afforded some government workers 
vary vastly nationwide because federal circuit courts disagree over how to interpret an 
exemption common to five landmark employment statutes. Each statute defines “employee” 
for its purposes to exclude politicians and certain categories of politicians’ appointees—
including government employees appointed by elected officials to serve at “the policymaking 
level.” Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court has defined who belongs to 
the “policymaking-level” class. Consequently, lower federal courts across the country have 
adopted their own standards to fill the gap, creating a wide circuit split. At stake in this 
employment law vagary are basic worker rights guaranteed by major federal statutes. The 
U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should articulate a lucid definition for the exception for 
appointees on the “policymaking level” that honors Congress’s intent for a narrow exception: 
the exemption should apply only to positions characterized by both a direct working 
relationship with the appointer and an explicit duty to make substantive policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the professionals that elected officials appoint to serve them 
at the “policymaking level” of American government. Agency directors 
likely spring to mind. Perhaps also executive cabinet members. But do 
probation officers1 or health inspectors?2 Would you include part-time 
assessors3 or sheriffs’ deputies?4 Some federal judges do deem such 
employees as serving at the “policymaking level”—a status that can cost 
workers some of their basic civil rights protections. 
Meanwhile, other federal courts take a contrary approach—declining 
to label as policymakers,5 for instance, the director of a senior services 
                                                     
1. O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003 WL 23101795, at *10 (S.D. Ind. 
Feb. 24, 2003). 
2. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993). 
3. Beckmann v. Darden, 351 F. Supp. 2d 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
4. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 
1218 (7th Cir. 1991). In both cases, probationary deputies asserted they had been fired in improper 
acts of political patronage. 
5. In each case, that determination was ultimately left to a jury; the judges in each rejected 
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agency,6 a police commander,7 the head of a juvenile detention training 
center,8 and—again—sheriffs’ deputies.9 
The difference: geography. Whether courts deem politicians’ 
appointees10 as “policymaking-level” workers—and thus beyond the 
reach of workers’ rights statutes—depends on where the workers live. 
The civil rights and workplace protections afforded some government 
workers vary vastly nationwide because federal circuit courts disagree 
over how to interpret an exemption shared by five landmark employment 
statutes. Congress excluded elected officials and their top advisers from 
the laws protecting employees against discrimination11 and substandard 
employment conditions.12 Each statute defines “employee” for its 
purposes13 to exclude politicians and certain categories of politicians’ 
appointees who are not protected by civil service laws.14 The exempted 
categories—virtually identical among the statutes—include government 
employees who are appointed by elected officials to serve at “the 
                                                     
defendants’ claims that the plaintiffs were excluded as a matter of law under an exemption for 
“policymaking level” appointees. 
6. Jones-Walsh v. Town of Cicero, No. 04 C 6029, 2005 WL 2293671, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 
2005). 
7. Gomez-Mesquita v. City of Detroit, No. 06-12844, 2007 WL 2225859, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
2, 2007). 
8. Collins v. Cook Cnty., No. 06 CV 6651, 2008 WL 4925009, at *5 (N.D. Ill Nov. 14, 2008). 
9. Morgan v. Sheriff of Tangipahoa Parish, Civil Action No. 77-3814, 1979 WL 108, at *2 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 28, 1979); Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976). 
10. The author has chosen the term “politicians’ appointees” over the more commonly used 
phrase “political appointees” because the latter implies a broader and potentially off-mark status, 
i.e., employees appointed by a political process. By contrast, the statutory term at issue here refers 
to only employees appointed directly by elected officials. 
11. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).  
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
13. The exceptions are codified as follows: 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f); 29 
U.S.C. § 2611(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of the FLSA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) reads, in part: “The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an 
employer, except that the term ‘employee’ shall not include any person elected to public office in 
any State or political subdivision of any State . . . or any person chosen by such officer to be on such 
officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with 
respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.” 
14. State civil service laws govern terms and conditions of public employment. They include 
standards for appointment and termination; they are intended to foster merit-based decisions and 
prevent politically-motivated public employment actions. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Civil Service § 1. 
(“[T]he historical and fundamental purpose of the civil service and its merit system principles is to 
insulate a state work force from political influence so as to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the state government.”). 
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policymaking level.”15 Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme 
Court has defined who belongs to that “policymaking” class.16 The result 
is a statutory definition of “employee” so convoluted one federal judge 
described it as “an outstanding example of bad draftsmanship.”17 
Consequently, lower federal courts across the country have adopted their 
own standards to fill the gap, creating a wide circuit split.18 In 2010, the 
Seventh Circuit expressly declined to bridge the gap, deciding instead 
that the exception denied discrimination protections to all nine hundred19 
of Illinois’s assistant state’s attorneys.20 
Dozens of cases illustrate the inconsistent application of the 
“policymaking” exception. For example, one federal judge in New 
Mexico dismissed a former town administrator’s age discrimination 
claim after deeming the position as on “policymaking level,” in part 
because the administrator could recommend policies to superiors.21 But 
an Iowa judge came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts, finding 
that a county agency director did not qualify for the exception because 
he could only recommend policies, while his superiors retained the final 
                                                     
15. In each statute, the exception is defined as being on “the” or “a” “policymaking level,” never 
as “policymaker.” In fact, the First Circuit Court of Appeals said that distinction is consequential in 
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1988). The point of the distinction is well taken. 
However, for the sake of simplicity, this Comment will at times use abbreviated references to the 
exception, for example, “policymaker exception.” 
16. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that Missouri’s appointed state judges 
are at the policymaking level for purposes of discrimination statutes, and in doing so suggested that 
state judges are thus broadly excluded. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991). In Gregory, 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not endorse a general standard for evaluating whether an employee 
serves on “policymaking level.” Id. Instead, it ruled narrowly on the question of whether the statute, 
i.e., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), applied to judges: “We will not read the 
ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included . . . In the 
context of a statute that plainly excludes most important state public officials, ‘appointee on the 
policymaking level’ is sufficiently broad that we cannot conclude that the statute plainly covers 
appointed state judges. Therefore, it does not.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
17. Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976). 
18. Compare Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
__ S.Ct. __, 2011 WL 4530126 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (No. 10-1163), with Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t 
of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2000). 
19. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Leonard Cahnmann at 13, Opp, 630 F.3d 616 (No. 10-1060), 
2010 WL 1062296.  
20. Opp, 630 F.3d at 621–22. In Opp, the Seventh Circuit dismissed appeals by three plaintiffs. 
Id. at 622. The Circuit had previously consolidated the cases brought by two of the plaintiffs, Opp 
and Barrett. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, Opp, 630 F.3d 616 (Nos. 09-3714, 09-3923), 2010 WL 
3950610, at *6. The Circuit declined to consolidate the claim by the third party, Cahnmann, but 
decided his appeal the same day. Id. 
21. Terry v. Town of Red River, Civ. No. 90-206 SC, 1995 WL 442099, at *4 (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 
1991) (finding town administrator served on the policymaking level because he enjoyed discretion 
and could recommended policy). 
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say.22 Another judge barred a discrimination claim by a deputy elections 
supervisor because he held authority to “arrest, subpoena and investigate 
possible violations of elections laws,” which the judge interpreted as 
policymaking-level duties.23 But another judge allowed a former sheriff 
deputy’s suit, explaining that the policymaking exemption was “aimed at 
persons such as members of a governor’s cabinet.”24 And a judge in 
Indiana said a probation officer qualified as a policymaker because her 
decisions “may promote or undermine the policies” of others.25 But a 
federal judge in Texas allowed a suit by a former city manager, finding 
she was not exempted because she did not actually make policy—she 
merely implemented it.26 
At stake in this employment law vagary are basic worker rights 
guaranteed by federal statutes. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
bars discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.27 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits 
age discrimination against workers who are at least forty years old.28 The 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides minimum wage and overtime 
pay protections.29 The Equal Pay Act (EPA) mandates equal pay 
between the sexes for comparable work.30 And the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) requires larger employers to provide unpaid leave to 
employees with serious health conditions or family caretaking 
obligations.31 According to the shared definition of “employee,” each of 
                                                     
22. Brown v. Poke Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S.D. Iowa 1992). 
23. Russo v. Ryerson, No. 01-CV-4458 JLL, 2006 WL 477006, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2006). In 
the unpublished opinion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that his duties were “more 
administrative than discretionary,” with Russo noting that he “did not speak on behalf of a 
policymaker and made no significant changes to the election supervision system.” Id. Still, the court 
held that the plaintiff enjoyed sufficient discretion to qualify for the policymaking exception: “[A] 
position which possesses the authority to arrest, subpoena and investigate possible violations of 
elections laws necessarily involves policy considerations. Although Russo . . . did not have the 
discretion not to enforce the elections laws, [he] possessed broad discretion regarding how to 
structure and execute investigations into possible violations. These exercises of discretion constitute 
policymaking.” Id. 
24. Howard v. Ward Cnty., 418 F. Supp. 494, 502 (D.N.D. 1976); see also Morgan v. Sheriff of 
Tangipahoa Parish, Civil Action No. 77-3814, 1979 WL 108, at *2 (D. La. Mar. 28, 1979). 
25. O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003 WL 23101795, at *10 (S.D. Ind. 
Feb. 24, 2003).  
26. Gomez v. City of Eagle Pass, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004–05 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).  
29. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201–219, 203(e)(2)(C)(ii)(III) (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009), amended by Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. 
30. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).  
31. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611(3) (2006), incorporating by 
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these statutes denies protection to workers appointed at the 
“policymaking level”—making interpretation of that term critical to 
determining public employees’ rights. 
The unresolved scope of the “policymaking-level” exemption results 
in judicial discord over who is protected by the laws against 
discrimination and shoddy work conditions.32 At one end of the 
spectrum, the Seventh Circuit reads the phrase broadly: the exception 
denies protection to employees who so much as implement policies, or 
offer suggestions about them.33 Several other circuits embrace a much 
narrower approach, holding that the exception applies only to top 
appointees “closely associated” with the elected officials who appointed 
them.34 
This Comment asserts the need for a single, lucid definition of the 
“policymaking-level” exception, and endorses an approach based on 
statutory language, legislative history and policy objectives. Part I 
introduces the laws at issue and the development of the exception for 
appointees at the “policymaking level.” Part II examines the split 
between: (1) the Seventh Circuit’s long-standing but unique approach; 
and (2) the narrower standard most thoroughly developed by the Second 
Circuit and generally accepted by several other circuits. Part III argues 
that both approaches miss the mark, and advocates instead for a more 
precise three-part analysis that better reflects congressional intent: the 
“policymaking-level” exception should apply only to professionals who 
work directly with their appointers and who establish official policy of a 
substantive nature. 
                                                     
reference the exemptions identified in the FLSA at 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2006). 
32. Congress has enacted a separate remedy under the Government Employees Rights Act 
(GERA) for some appointees asserting employment discrimination, including Title VII and ADEA 
claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)–(c) (2006), amended by the Congressional Accountability Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (Jan. 23, 1995); see also 1 Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Federal 
Law § 13:6. GERA requires aggrieved workers seek administrative relief from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, 542 F.3d 802, 808 
n.4 (10th Cir. 2008). Only once that review is complete might workers get access to court by 
appealing an adverse EEOC decision to the United States Court of Appeals. Id. Once the EEOC has 
made a determination, de novo review is not available. Guy v. Illinois, 958 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 
(N.D. Ill. 1997). Also, if the EEOC finds for the worker, unlike under Title VII, the worker is “not 
entitled to recover punitive damages under GERA.” Dyer v. Radcliffe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 
(S.D. Ohio 2001).  
33. See, e.g., Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that “Warzon’s 
complaint and attachments are replete with information showing that she had significant input and 
authority over” government policies). 
34. This approach is most fully developed by the Second Circuit. See infra Part II.C. 
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I. CONGRESS INTENDED TO CATALYZE SWEEPING SOCIAL 
CHANGE THROUGH THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE-RIGHTS 
STATUTES 
The statutes35 subject to this interpretive inconsistency share two 
major policy goals: to shield workers from discrimination based on their 
membership in a protected class, and to protect employees from legally 
unacceptable pay and workplace conditions.36 They stem from 
Congress’s aspiration to catalyze fundamental social change.37 
A.  The Statutes at Stake Protect Employees from Poor Work 
Conditions and Discrimination Based on Race, Religion, Age, and 
Caregiver Status 
The oldest of the statutes at issue is the FLSA, which established a 
national minimum wage, overtime pay protections, and child labor 
standards, with some significant categorical exceptions.38 The goal was 
to protect workers from “oppressive” work conditions and “substandard” 
wages.39 In 1963, Congress broadened the FLSA through the EPA, 
which bars sex-based wage disparities.40 
The most comprehensive of the anti-discrimination statutes at issue is 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,41 which bars certain forms of 
discrimination42 and aims to foster racial integration.43 The Act is best 
                                                     
35. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 
(2006); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§2601–2654 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
36. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 
450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981). 
37. See infra Part I.A.  
38.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219. 
39. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739 (“The principal congressional purpose in enacting the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 was to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive 
working hours, ‘labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard 
of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. 
§ 202(a)). 
40. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)).  
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a–2000h (“[T]o enforce the constitutional right to 
vote . . . to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations . . . to protect 
constitutional rights in public facilities and public education . . . to prevent discrimination in 
federally assisted programs [and employment] . . . and for other purposes.”). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246 
(1964) (“The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through 
peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimination in voting, as well as in places of accommodation 
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known for its provisions mandating school desegregation and 
prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accommodation.44 
Additionally, Title VII of the Act bars most employers45 from 
employment discrimination against protected classes.46 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has described the Act’s broad remedial purpose as: “to 
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that 
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white 
employees over other employees.”47 At the time of the Act’s passage, 
Congress considered fairness in employment an integral element to the 
success of its overall civil rights goals.48 Over the decades, Congress has 
broadened the law’s scope49 and courts have liberally construed the 
Act.50 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has read it to include a 
prohibition against unintentional discrimination through policies that 
have a “disparate impact” on protected classes.51 
In 1967, Congress added the ADEA to the civil rights arsenal, barring 
                                                     
and public facilities, federally secured programs and in employment.”). 
43. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979). 
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), c to c-9 (2006). 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006). The statute defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person” excluding the United States government, Indian tribes, any department or agency of the 
District of Columbia, and “a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization).” 
Id. 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). The statute bars discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. Id. 
47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).  
48. The U.S. Supreme Court has said: “Congress’s primary concern in enacting the prohibition 
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with ‘the plight of the 
Negro in our economy.’” Weber, 443 U.S. at 202–03 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) 
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). The Weber Court noted that during Congressional debate, Sen. 
Humphrey highlighted statistical trends showing that the disparity between nonwhite unemployment 
and white unemployment had nearly doubled from 1947 to 1962. “Congress feared that the goals of 
the Civil Rights Act—the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society—could not 
be achieved unless this trend was reversed . . . . [I]t was clear to Congress that ‘[t]he crux of the 
problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been 
traditionally closed to them. . . . [I]t was to this problem that Title VII’s prohibition against racial 
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed.” Id. 
49. See infra Part I.B. 
50. Courts generally read Title VII liberally in order to support its policy objectives. Nancy E. 
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 
75 n.4 (1984) (citing Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rowe v. Gen. 
Motors Corp. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972)).  
51. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
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some workplace discrimination based on relatively old age.52 Congress 
intended the ADEA to “promote employment of older persons based on 
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”53 As with 
Title VII, Congress hoped that the ADEA would foster social change.54 
Congress enacted the FMLA in 1993 largely to address a specific area 
of workplace sex discrimination: bias against women workers based on 
their status as family caregivers.55 Congress found that “family 
caretaking often falls on women,” affecting their working lives more 
than that of men and creating “serious potential” for discrimination.56 
The FMLA requires covered employers to provide eligible workers up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year to care for a new baby or a 
relative with a “serious health” condition.57 The FMLA applies to those 
employed by businesses with staffs of fifty or more workers.58 
Each statute initially exempted from its protections a substantial work 
force: government employees. Congress incrementally expanded each 
statute to cover many public employees—but each time carved out a 
number of exceptions, including the exclusion for political appointees on 
the policymaking level.59 
                                                     
52. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (current 
version at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006)). The U.S. Supreme Court has said, “[T]he ADEA was 
concerned to protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the 
relatively young.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590–91 (2004). Also, 
“[T]he ADEA, among other things, makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.’” 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). 
The ADEA applies to workers at least forty years old and recognizes defenses including “age as a 
bona fide occupational qualification, differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age, 
discharge or other personnel action for good cause, and observation of the terms of a bona fide 
seniority or employee benefit plan.” 75 AM. JUR. Trials § 363 (2000). 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
54. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (“Congress designed 
the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a ‘spur or catalyst’ to cause employers ‘to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as 
possible, the last vestiges’ of discrimination.” (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405, 417–18 (1975)). 
55. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (current version at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006)). 
56. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)–(6). 
57. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A), (C). 
58. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). 
59. See infra Part I.B. 
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B. Congress Later Expanded Several of the Worker Protection 
Statutes to Include Government Workers—with Narrow Exceptions 
Title VII suffered a rocky start and weak enforcement due in large 
part to Congress’s decisions to limit the enforcement powers of the 
EEOC60 and to exclude public workers from the Civil Rights Act’s 
protection.61 Civil rights advocates persistently demanded that Congress 
expand that Act, complaining that the law failed to protect employees of 
schools as well as local, state, and federal governments despite 
widespread acknowledgement of discrimination by such employers.62 In 
1972, Congress addressed those issues by amending Title VII, 
substantially bolstering the EEOC’s authority and expanding the statute 
to protect state and local government employees.63 This change 
immediately brought more than ten million additional workers within the 
statute’s ambit.64 
Still, lawmakers excluded several categories of public workers from 
coverage, including the category of workers appointed at the 
policymaking level. The “very narrow” exceptions originally proposed 
by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina65 deny coverage to government 
employees, except those protected by state civil service laws. The 
exemptions apply to (1) elected officials and (2) staffers appointed by an 
elected official to serve on the official’s personal staff, on a 
“policymaking level” or as “an immediate adviser.”66 When the 
Congressional conference committee adopted the amendment, it “re-
emphasized its narrow coverage.”67 The committee directed that the 
                                                     
60. George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity 
Employment Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 824–25 (1972) (noting that the original law 
allowed the federal government very limited powers and as a result, “the reality for most aggrieved 
individuals was a long round of negotiations with employers who, more often than not, were 
undeterred by the threat of an individual suit and simply refused to comply”). 
61. Id. at 847.  
62. Id. at 847–48. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. Sape also noted that “studies seem to indicate that the employment practices of the states 
are at least as discriminatory as those found in the private sector . . . . The intention of Congress in 
expanding Title VII to include state and local governments was to provide an effective remedy 
through federal action to governmental employees.” Id. at 848–49 (noting that it did not supplant 
existing remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). 
65. Id. at 861. 
66. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)–(f) (2006).  
67. Sape, supra note 60, at 861. Writing shortly after the amendment’s adoption four decades 
ago, Sape also predicted: “Despite this language there undoubtedly will be extensive litigation 
involving this issue, resulting from the infinite variety of state and local government hierarchies, 
jobs and local personnel systems which will seek to maximize the exemption.” Id. at 862. 
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exceptions applied narrowly and only to employees at the “highest 
policymaking levels,” such as cabinet members.68 
Two years after Congress added most local government workers to 
the scope of Title VII, it similarly amended the ADEA.69 Because of the 
amendment’s sparse legislative history and the fact that it was modeled 
after Title VII, courts generally turn to Title VII’s legislative history 
(described above) for interpretive guidance.70 
As with the discrimination statutes, state and local governments were 
initially exempted from the FLSA. Congress began narrowing that 
exemption in 1966, when it extended minimum wage and overtime 
standards to public hospitals, schools and certain mass-transit agencies.71 
In 1974, Congress expanded the statute’s scope to include nearly all state 
and local government employees.72 Today, the FLSA excludes elected 
officials and their appointees in language nearly identical to that used in 
the amended Title VII and the ADEA.73 The modern definition of 
                                                     
68. Id. at 862 (citing 118 CONG. REC. S3461 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H1694 
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972) (“This exemption is intended to be construed very narrowly and is in no 
way intended to establish an overall narrowing of the expanded coverage of State and local 
government employees.”)).  
69. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 2747 (current 
version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2006)). 
70. See, e.g., Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 2000); Montgomery 
v. Brookshire, 34 F.3d 291, 294–95 (5th Cir. 1994); Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“The definition of ‘employee’ found in ADEA, however, was patterned after the virtually 
identical provision contained in Title VII.”); EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990), 
overruled in part by Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 
52, 55–56 (1st Cir. 1988). See generally Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1093, 1099–101 (1993). Eglit discusses “instances of joint development [of the two statutes], 
keyed to similar statutory language.” Id. at 1100. He refers to the statutes as “statutory cousin[s]” 
that have undergone “joint evolution” and “tandem development.” Id. at 1097–103. Courts also turn 
to Title VII’s history to evaluate the FLSA. Birch v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Prob. Ct., 392 F.3d 151, 161 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have interpreted the FLSA’s ‘personal staff’ and “policymaking’ 
exemptions consistently with their Title VII counterparts.”). Finally, courts turn to Title VII to 
construe the EPA. Spann-Wilder v. City of N. Charleston, C.A. No. 2:08-0156-MBS, 2010 WL 
3222235, at *4 n.4 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Because of the identical language in Title VII and 
EPA, these exceptions are interpreted in the same way under both statutes.”) (referencing Bland v. 
New York, 263 F. Supp. 2d 526, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This exemption [under Title VII] is 
identical to exemptions under the ADEA . . . the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . and Equal Pay Act 
and a number of other statutes.”)).  
71. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 1, 80 Stat. 830 (1966) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006)). For more discussion, see Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 533 (1985) (citing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1966, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).  
72. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 § 6. 
73. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 2(5), 86 Stat. 103 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)), excluded from Title VII and ADEA protections “any 
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employee in the FLSA also applies to the FMLA because the FMLA 
incorporates by reference the FLSA’s definition of “employee.”74 
II. CIRCUIT COURTS ARE WIDELY SPLIT OVER WHICH 
EMPLOYEES ARE EXCLUDED FROM STATUTORY 
WORKER PROTECTIONS 
Circuit courts disagree over which types of employees fall within the 
“policymaking-level” exception from federal employment protections. 
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a sweeping construction, applying the 
exclusion to workers who so much as suggest policies to the decision-
makers, or who exercise discretion in implementing others’ policies.75 
By contrast, other circuits apply a far narrower definition, reserving the 
exception for top public officials.76 The narrow approach is most 
thoroughly developed by the Second Circuit, which has expressly 
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s standard.77 The Second Circuit holds that 
the policymaking-level exception applies only to appointees who “would 
normally work closely with and be accountable to the [elected] official 
who appointed them.”78 
                                                     
person elected to public office . . . or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s 
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to 
the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office . . . [except] employees subject to the 
civil service laws.” The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 § 6, excluded from FLSA 
protections any individual who “(I) holds a public elective office . . . [or] (II) is selected by the 
holder of the office to be a member of his personal staff [or] (III) is appointed by such an 
officeholder to serve on the policymaking level, OR (IV) who is an immediate adviser to such an 
officeholder with respect to the constitutional or legal powers of his office.” 
74. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2006); see O’Reilly v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 102CV1242-DFH, 2003 
WL 23101795, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 24, 2003). 
75. See, e.g., Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991). 
76. See infra Parts II.C., II.D. 
77. Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 2000). For First Amendment 
political patronage cases, that circuit uses a list of guiding factors to address the Elrod and Branti 
tests. Id. at 744. “Our Title VII analysis, by contrast, draws on the language of the statute and 
congressional intent.” Id. at 747. 
78. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Second Circuit later clarified that it read the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s overruling of Vermont as applying only to the circumstance of that case. The circuit has 
since said the underlying analysis remains valid, as does that circuit’s standard for determining 
policymaking status. “Its reasoning was still sound.” Butler, 211 F.3d at 748; see also Tranello v. 
Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a deputy county attorney was not exempted 
from the ADEA: “We reaffirm our adherence to the sound conclusion reached on this issue in 
Vermont, . . . ‘Congress meant to deny ADEA protection only to such appointees as would normally 
work closely with and be accountable to the official who appointed them.’” (quoting Vermont, 904 
F.2d at 800)). 
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A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Evaluated the Definition of 
“Policymaking Level” in Establishing Separate “Political 
Patronage” Rules 
To interpret the policymaking-level exception within the employment 
statutes, the Seventh Circuit imported U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
related to workers’ free speech rights. Under the First Amendment, 
public employers may not hire or fire workers based on the employees’ 
political beliefs—a practice known as political patronage.79 However, 
the Court long ago identified a need to balance workers’ constitutional 
right of free speech against the pragmatic need to prevent obstructive 
partisanship within government operations.80 Specifically, newly elected 
officials could be hampered if forced to retain certain appointees with 
opposing political views.  
In Elrod v. Burns,81 employees of a county sheriff’s department 
asserted they had been fired or threatened with termination because they 
did not belong to the same political party as the sheriff.82 The workers 
claimed the dismissals violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.83 A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed—to a point.84 The 
plurality held patronage dismissals unconstitutional when applied to 
employees who are not policymakers.85 Thus, the Elrod plurality held 
that politicians enjoyed a limited right to install like-minded and 
“political[ly] loyal[]” “policymaking” officials who would not 
undermine the agenda of a newly elected administration, which was 
“presumably sanctioned by the electorate.”86 In other words, if voters 
replace an official with someone from a different political party, the 
newly elected official should not be forced to retain a potentially 
obstructionist second-in-command whose loyalty remains with the 
former boss. The Elrod Court provided no bright-line rules for 
determining policymaking-level status. Instead, it explained that courts 
                                                     
79. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976). 
80. Id. at 367. 
81. Id. at 347. 
82. Id. at 349–51. 
83. Id. at 350. The U.S. Supreme Court explained patronage thusly in Elrod: “Under that practice, 
public employees hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable manner, 
support for the favored political party. The threat of dismissal for failure to provide that support 
unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association . . . .” Id. at 359. 
84. Id. at 360 (“[T]he prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment protections [by political 
patronage] is not absolute. Restraints are permitted for appropriate reasons.”). 
85. Id. at 372–73. 
86. Id. at 367. 
WLR December Galloway FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011 4:47 PM 
2011] A “NARROW EXCEPTION” RUN AMOK 887 
 
should determine policymaker status based on “whether the employee 
acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the implementation of broad 
goals.”87 
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court modified its exclusion from 
the political patronage rule. In Branti v. Finkel,88 the Court signaled that 
“policymaking” was not a litmus-test trait; rather, it is sometimes proper 
for politics to drive the hiring or termination decisions of subordinates 
“who are neither confidential nor policymaking in character.”89 The 
Branti court clarified that it intended the doctrine to allow employers 
greater discretion “if an employee’s private political beliefs would 
interfere with the discharge of his public duties.”90 The Seventh Circuit 
has held the Court’s rules allowing for limited political discrimination 
should also apply in statutory worker rights claims. 
B. The Seventh Circuit Applies the Elrod/Branti Standard to Define 
the “Policymaking-Level” Exception in Federal Employment 
Statutes 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s political 
patronage analyses in Elrod and Branti to define the reach of Title VII 
and other employment discrimination statutes.91 First, while deciding a 
patronage case in 1981, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Elrod and Branti 
to direct that politically motivated hiring and termination are lawful 
when “the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or 
indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decisionmaking on issues 
where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their 
implementation.”92 Then, in 1993, the Seventh Circuit announced that 
                                                     
87. Id. at 368. 
88. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
89. Id. at 518 (citing, as an example, hiring election precinct supervisors from certain political 
parties when election laws require representation of different political parties). Furthermore, “the 
ultimate inquiry is not whether the label ‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; 
rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an 
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Id. Applied to 
the instant case: “[W]hatever policymaking occurs in the public defender’s office must relate to the 
needs of individual clients and not to any partisan political interests.” Id. at 519. While endorsing a 
potentially broader exception from political patronage law, the Branti Court ruled for the plaintiffs 
in the instant case; the Court held that two assistant county public defenders were not policymakers 
and therefore it would be unconstitutional to fire them based on their political views. Id. at 519–20. 
90. Id. at 517 (explaining that in such cases, a worker’s “First Amendment rights may be required 
to yield to the State’s vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency”). 
91. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1993). 
92. Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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the same rule applied to federal employment statutes, starting with the 
ADEA.93 In affirming the dismissal of an age discrimination claim by a 
former city health inspector, the court said: “[t]he reasons for exempting 
the office from the patronage ban apply with equal force to the 
requirements of the ADEA.”94 The Circuit has reaffirmed this standard 
in more than one dozen cases.95 
The Seventh Circuit has rejected a bright line between policymaking 
and policy implementation.96 Indeed, the court applied the 
policymaking-level exception to an appointee who claimed he was 
expressly disallowed from making policy, deeming him at the 
policymaking level because he might advise the actual policymakers.97 
The Circuit has explained that actual authority is not required to qualify 
for policymaking-level status if the employee in question enjoys 
sufficient access to the decision-maker, i.e., if he or she offers input, yet 
without control.98 Similarly, sheriff’s deputies fall within the Seventh 
Circuit’s exception because they exercise discretion while on patrol.99 
                                                     
93. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310. In Heck, the plaintiff alleged both political and age discrimination 
claims. The Seventh Circuit first considered the political patronage question. Id. at 308. The court 
held that the plaintiff was a policymaker under Elrod and Branti, which, in the Seventh Circuit, is 
based on whether the position “authorizes, either directly or indirectly, meaningful input into 
government decisionmaking.” Id. at 309 (citations omitted) (quoting Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 
765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1985)). Thus, the court held, the plaintiff did not qualify for First 
Amendment protection. Id. at 310. The court later moved to the question of the ADEA and simply 
upheld a lower court holding—without providing analysis of the ADEA’s language or history—that 
the Elrod/Branti standard applies. Id. Three years later, the Seventh Circuit ratified that standard 
and endorsed its use in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 144 (7th Cir. 
1996) (again omitting discussion of the statute’s plain text or legislative history). 
94. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310. 
95. See, e.g., Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a case brought by a 
former city zoning board chairman); Americanos, 74 F.3d 138 (dismissing a case brought by a 
former deputy state attorney general). 
96. Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The appellants 
contend that Assistant State’s Attorneys merely implement policy actions on behalf of the State’s 
Attorney. We disagree. An Assistant State’s Attorney carries out policy on behalf of the 
government, and in doing so has ‘meaningful input into governmental decision-making . . . .’”). 
97. See Americanos, 74 F.3d 138. The Americanos court acknowledged plaintiff’s contention that 
he “‘was required to refer all issues and questions involving politics and policy making to the Chief 
Counsel,’ [who would] make the ultimate decision on how to implement the AG’s goals.” Id. at 
142. And yet the court deemed the employee to be on the policymaking level because “it is likely 
that in making such referrals Americanos was asked to advise his superiors concerning what his 
research into these issues revealed, and what he thought would be the correct course of legal 
action.” Id. (emphasis added).  
98. Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1995). 
99. Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[D]eputies on patrol or other 
assignment frequently work autonomously, giving them wide latitude and discretion in the 
performance of their duties and in the implementation of department goals.”). 
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The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of “policymaking level” also 
includes, for instance, research analysts who provide information that 
might influence actual decisionmakers.100 
The Seventh Circuit recently applied the “policymaking” label to 
another broad job title: state assistant attorneys general. In Opp v. Office 
of State’s Attorney of Cook County,101 three former assistant state’s 
attorneys alleged that age discrimination motivated their 2007 
terminations, in violation of the ADEA.102 A federal district court 
dismissed their claims on the ground that they are not covered by the 
ADEA.103 The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision, holding as a matter 
of law that the state’s nine hundred assistant attorneys general qualify as 
“policymakers.”104 
In Opp, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ request 
that the court abandon its unique test and develop a standard for the 
policymaking-level exception that squares with other circuits.105 Instead, 
the court stood by its practice of effectively equating policy 
implementation with policymaking:  
The appellants contend that Assistant State’s Attorneys merely 
implement policy actions on behalf of the State’s Attorney. We 
disagree. An Assistant State’s Attorney carries out policy on 
behalf of the government, and in doing so has “meaningful input 
into governmental decision-making on issues where there is 
room for principled disagreement on goals or their 
implementation.”106  
In other words, it held, simply “carry[ing] out” policy directives “on 
behalf” of the officials who hold actual authority to set such policies 
amounts to serving at the policymaking level.107 
C. The Second Circuit Uses Legislative Language and Intent to 
Construe the Scope of the “Policymaking Level” 
The Second Circuit first construed the policymaking-level exception 
                                                     
100. Bonds v. Milwaukee Cnty., 207 F.3d 969, 977 (7th Cir. 2000). 
101. Opp, 630 F.3d at 616. 
102. Id. at 618–19. 
103. Opp v. Office of State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 660 F. Supp. 2d 932 (2009). 
104. Opp, 630 F.3d at 620–21. 
105. Id. at 620 (“We choose . . . not to draw a distinction between how aggrieved individuals are 
interpreted as policymakers under the First Amendment and under the ADEA.”). 
106. Id. at 621. 
107. Id. 
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in 1990 in EEOC v. Vermont. 108 There, the court turned to traditional 
canons of statutory construction to determine the breadth of the 
policymaking-level exception.109 First, the court examined the ADEA’s 
definition of “employee.”110 The statute lists “policymaking level” as the 
second of three categories exempted from that definition.111 The 
Vermont court noted that the first and third classes—“personal staff” and 
“immediate adviser(s)”112—are narrow, “suggest[ing] that Congress 
intended [a] more limited interpretation” of the exempted categories.113 
The court found that these categories “plainly” refer only to employees 
who “work closely” with officials.114 The court then inferred that 
Congress intended the policymaking-level category to generally align in 
scope with those more limited categories:115 Had Congress intended the 
policymaker category to be read more broadly than the other categories, 
it likely would have put that class at the end of the list.116 
The Vermont court next considered the legislative history of Title 
VII.117 Congress created exceptions for policymaking-level appointees 
and others in the 1972 Title VII amendments that expanded the law to 
government employees.118 Lawmakers similarly amended the ADEA 
two years later.119 Discussing an earlier version of the amendment 
(which did not yet include the “policymaking-level” exception), the 
bill’s manager120 told his colleagues: “[t]he purpose of the 
                                                     
108. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
109. See id. at 798 (“The contents and structure of the exception suggest that Congress intended 
the more limited interpretation.”). 
110. Id. 
111. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006). 
112. Id. 
113. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. (“[W]e would infer that the middle category was intended to share basic characteristics of 
the categories that surrounded it.”) 
117. Id. (“Though there is scant legislative history with respect to the definition of ‘employee’ in 
the ADEA, we are aided by the fact that the ADEA was patterned after Title VII . . . .”); see also 
Sape, supra note 60. 
118. See supra Part I.A.  
119. See supra Part I.A. 
120. During congressional floor debates, “the bill manager for the majority party controls the 
time devoted to debate and to particular amendments, determining which members speak and for 
how long.” Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Meanings: Deriving 
Interpretive Principles from a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 
988 (2011). 
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amendment . . . [is] to exempt from coverage those who are chosen by 
the . . . elected official . . . and who are in a close personal relationship 
and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first line of 
advisers.”121 Lawmakers later added the exemption for appointees at the 
policymaking level. They issued a statement explaining that their 
intention was to exempt “persons . . . at the highest levels of the 
departments or agencies . . . such as cabinet officers, and persons with 
comparable responsibilities . . . . It is (our) intent that this exemption 
shall be construed narrowly.”122 From that legislative history, the 
Vermont court concluded: “Congress meant to deny ADEA protection 
only to such appointees as would normally work closely with and be 
accountable to the official who appointed them.”123 
The U.S. Supreme Court effectively overruled the Second Circuit’s 
Vermont holding that state judges were not policymakers.124 However, 
the Second Circuit has since stood by its underlying reasoning in 
Vermont that the exception was to be narrowly construed and applied 
only to “such appointees as would normally work closely with and be 
accountable to the official who appointed them.”125 Most recently, in 
Butler v. New York State Department of Law,126 the Second Circuit 
reaffirmed its rule that courts should narrowly construe127 the 
policymaking exception to apply only to appointees holding 
“policymaking positions at the highest levels”128 of government agencies 
who “would normally work closely with and be accountable to the 
official who appointed them.”129 
D. Other Circuits Support the Second Circuit’s General Approach 
Several other circuits have adopted standards for interpreting the 
                                                     
121. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 799 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (emphasis in original) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 4492–93 (1972)).  
122. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 43 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2180, 1971 WL 
11301 (emphasis added).  
123. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800. 
124. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The Second Circuit acknowledged that Gregory 
overruled its specific holding in Vermont that an appointed state judge was not an appointee on the 
policymaking level. Tranello v. Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1992).  
125. See Tranello, 962 F.2d at 250. 
126. 211 F.3d 739 (2d Cir. 2000). 
127. Id. at 749. 
128. Id. at 747 (quoting Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800). 
129. Id. at 748 (“The resolution of the issue turns on whether it was part of the job of a Deputy 
Bureau Chief to work closely with the AG.”). 
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scope of the “policymaking-level” exception similar to that of the 
Second Circuit.130 The First Circuit has agreed that Title VII’s legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended its exceptions to be narrowly 
construed to apply only to “top decisionmakers.”131 Similarly, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the Civil Rights Act’s legislative history reflects 
Congress’s intent to create a “narrow exemption” for appointed 
employees in a “close, personal . . . and . . . immediate relationship” with 
their appointer.132 Accordingly, the court held that a city staff director 
did not serve at the policymaking level, in part because “the staff 
director has occasionally advised the mayor on his constitutional and 
legal powers . . . . Direct interaction between the mayor and the staff 
director is minimal.”133 
The Eighth Circuit has also examined policymaking-level status 
according to the appointee’s authority and related factors.134 Without 
relying heavily on the legislative history of Title VII,135 the Eighth 
Circuit reached a conclusion similar to that of the Second Circuit: 
Congress’s exemption of appointees on the policymaking level 
“manifests an interest in excluding persons entrusted with extensive 
decisionmaking authority and discretionary power. . . .”136 In an earlier 
                                                     
130. The Fifth Circuit has not extensively evaluated the meaning of “policymaking level.” 
However, it has generally endorsed a narrow construction of the exceptions. See, e.g., Rutland v. 
Moore, 54 F.3d 226, 230 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Congressional conference committee statement 
that the exception was intended to apply “at the highest levels . . . such as cabinet officers”); 
Teneyuca v. Bexar Cnty., 767 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 1985) (in evaluating the related but separate 
“personal staff” exception, directing: “This Court’s consideration of these factors must be tempered 
by the legislative history of this provision which indicates that the exception is to be narrowly 
construed”).  
131. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding judges at the policymaking 
level for the purposes of the ADEA).  
132. Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 474 F.3d 747, 752 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding 
Congress intended the exception would apply to appointees with an “intimate and sensitive 
association” with the elected official (quoting Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 801 
(10th Cir. 1982)). 
133. Anderson, 690 F.2d at 801. 
134. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991); Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 278–79 (8th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by 
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). 
135. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 602 (noting about the legislative history: “we are not inclined to assign 
[it] a great deal of weight, since the only reliable guide to legislative intent is the language and 
structure of the statute itself”). 
136. Id. at 603. Gregory held that judges serve on the policymaking level because at least some of 
their decisions “will resolve issues previously unsettled and thus will create law . . . . [J]udges must 
exercise the same sort of discretion in decisionmaking, temper their rulings with the same sort of 
self-restraint, and engage in the same sort of thoughtful judgment that is required of ‘appointee[s] 
on the policymaking level’ in the executive and legislative branches.” Id. at 601–02. 
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case deciding an ADEA claim by a former state arts council director,137 
the Eighth Circuit spelled out several factors for evaluating whether the 
plaintiff was appointed at the policymaking level: (1) “whether the 
[appointee] has discretionary, rather than solely administrative powers,” 
(2) “whether the [appointee] serves at the pleasure of the appointing 
authority”; and (3) whether the appointee “formulates policy.”138 Thus, 
the Eighth Circuit generally accords with the First, Second, and Tenth 
Circuits in narrowly defining the scope of the policymaking-level 
exception within the context of worker right statutes. These Circuits 
have parted ways with the Seventh Circuit, which has adopted a 
relatively expansive interpretation of the policymaking exception based 
on analogy to political discrimination in employment law. 
III. CONGRESS OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD LIMIT 
THE POLICYMAKING EXCEPTION TO APPOINTEES WHO 
DIRECTLY FORMULATE SUBSTANTIVE POLICY 
Although Congress neglected to define “policymaking level” for the 
purposes of worker protection statutes, lawmakers did provide ample 
explicit and implicit guidance. The plain language of the statutes in 
question, their legislative history, and their context within broader social 
policy goals illuminate the shortcomings of the analyses by both camps 
in the circuit split. The Seventh Circuit makes two errors: (1) it 
improperly borrows a standard from the separate political discrimination 
doctrine, neglecting to follow fundamental canons of statutory 
construction; and (2) it misconstrues the Elrod/Branti doctrine that it 
imports from political patronage jurisprudence. The Second Circuit and 
others take a better approach, which honors the employment statutes’ 
language according to traditional canons of construction. However, that 
approach lacks sufficient lucidity and specificity. To correct these 
inadequacies and inconsistencies, either Congress or the U.S. Supreme 
Court should articulate a clear standard defining policymaking-level 
employees as top-level officials with working relationships with their 
appointees who are charged with substantive policy development. 
                                                     
137. Stillians, 843 F.2d 276.  
138. Id. at 278–79 (emphasis added). Two years later, the Eighth Circuit clarified that the factors 
were not intended to be an all-purpose test: the list is not “intended to be exhaustive or necessarily 
applicable in all respects to every kind of appointed official.” Gregory, 898 F.2d at 604. 
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A. The Plain Language of the Statutes Supports a Narrow 
Construction of the Policymaking Exception 
Statutory construction begins “with the text of the statute.” 139 Where 
a word or phrase is ambiguous, context clarifies.140 As Judge Learned 
Hand explained, statutory interpretation requires a holistic approach 
because words and phrases share a “communal existence” where 
individual segments inform neighboring words and “not only does the 
meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take 
their purport from the setting in which they are used.”141 Under the 
canon of construction noscitur a sociis, “an ambiguous term may be 
given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is 
associated.”142 When a statute includes enumerated terms, any relatively 
general terms accompanied by narrower counterparts should be narrowly 
construed under the “venerable principle of ejusdem generis” which 
“counsels us to construe the broad in light of the narrow.”143 
Here, Congress included the “policymaking level” as the second of 
three enumerated categories of exempted employees: “personal staff,” 
“employees on the policymaking level,” and “immediate advisers.”144 As 
the Second Circuit explained,145 courts should construe the policymaking 
category within its statutory context—or in Judge Hand’s words, its 
“communal existence.”146 Also, under the canon of noscitur a sociis, 
which directs consideration of surrounding language when interpreting a 
specific term, the middle (“policymaking”) term should be construed to 
share the same narrow character as the first and third categories. Finally, 
the “policymaking-level” exception should not be read to refer to policy 
advisers since that would improperly render the two categories 
redundant.147 
Rather than studying the statutes in question, the Seventh Circuit 
turned for direction by analogy to the U.S. Supreme Court’s political 
                                                     
139. Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007).  
140. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). 
141. Id. 
142. United States v. Stevens, __U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
143. United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001). 
144. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006). 
145. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990). 
146. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). 
147. See 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 21:1 (7th ed. 2008). 
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discrimination case law.148 The Seventh Circuit skipped over traditional 
analysis of the statutes’ language and Congress’s intent, 149 and instead 
applied the Elrod/Branti to statutory discrimination cases.150 While 
courts may sometimes properly construe statutes by analogy to other 
laws, even unrelated laws,151 the statutory language here is readily 
interpreted and does not require such a stretch. 
Moreover, neither Elrod nor Branti support the approach adopted by 
the Seventh Circuit. Rather, Elrod suggested a narrow scope in its 
exception from the general prohibition against political patronage: “In 
determining whether an employee occupies a policymaking position, 
consideration should . . . be given to whether the employee acts as an 
adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals.”152 
Elrod and Branti were intended only to facilitate the democratic process 
by allowing newly elected officials to replace politically hostile 
incumbent officers at the top levels of government.153 In contrast, the 
Seventh Circuit recasts the patronage standards to exempt a wide swath 
of workers from basic employment laws.154 The disconnect is manifest: 
                                                     
148. Heck v. City of Freeport, 985 F.2d 305, 311 (7th Cir. 1993). 
149. In 1993, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff was exempt from patronage protection 
because he was a policymaker under Elrod and Branti. Heck, 985 F.2d at 310. The court then held 
the same plaintiff exempt from ADEA protection for the same reason, without providing analysis of 
the ADEA’s language or history. Id. at 310. The Second Circuit explained: “The Seventh Circuit 
has used a single test to resolve the policymaker question under both the First Amendment and the 
employment discrimination statutes . . . . Our Title VII analysis, by contrast, draws on the language 
of the statute and congressional intent.” Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 746–47 
(2d Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying note 92. 
150. See, e.g., Heck, 985 F.2d at 310 (“The reasons for exempting the office from the patronage 
ban apply with equal force to the requirements of the ADEA.”).  
151. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, § 53:2. However, the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of 
the standard from the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment political patronage jurisprudence 
should not be evaluated under the canon of in pari materia. In pari materia is a canon of 
construction directing that matters that are of the “same subject” or “relating to the same matter” 
may be construed together. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004). The borrowed 
patronage standard used here is extrinsic to the employment rights statues at issue and does not 
“pertain to the same particular subject with sufficient focus to make it reasonable to suppose that 
legislators and persons affected by one statute would also be affected by another. . . . Where the 
relationship between the statutes is not that specific . . . the interpretive relevance of other statutes is 
found, if at all, in the evidence they may supply that certain modes of legislative action are 
sufficiently conventional or standardized in the legal system to influence the thinking of legislators 
and others who contemplate the meaning of a particular statute in the system.” 2B SINGER & 
SINGER, supra note 151, § 53:2 (citations omitted).  
152. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976) (emphasis added). 
153. See supra Part II.A.1. 
154. See, e.g., Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding as 
a matter of law that hundreds of assistant state attorneys general are appointed on the policymaking 
level). 
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the Elrod plurality declined to deem a chief deputy sheriff a policymaker 
in a political discrimination claim.155 Yet the Seventh Circuit has twice 
applied Elrod to reach the opposite conclusion in political patronage 
cases: holding as a matter of law that deputy sheriffs were policymakers 
and thus unprotected.156 The Circuit’s reasoning that patronage caselaw 
directs its statutory construction is especially awkward given the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s direction against reliance on a strict “policymaking” 
label in patronage cases. The Court clarified in Branti that its patronage 
exception was not to be applied according to a mechanical 
“policymaking-level” test; rather, the proper inquiry was whether 
partisan allegiance was an “appropriate requirement” for the position in 
question.157 Notably, Branti dissenters lamented their prediction that the 
majority’s holding would mean that assistant government attorneys 
would not be exempt from the patronage ban.158 Yet the Seventh Circuit 
recently relied on its reading of Elrod and Branti to justify deeming all 
Illinois assistant attorneys general as policymaking-level appointees, and 
therefore excluded from workers’ rights protections.159 Courts in that 
circuit have repeatedly defined state attorneys and prosecutors as 
policymaking-level appointees as a matter of law.160 
The misconstruction of the standard has not gone unnoticed. As the 
Eleventh Circuit said, “Application of the Seventh Circuit’s broad test 
has led to results far afield from Branti.”161 For example, in Americanos 
                                                     
155. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367–74 (creating policymaking exception to bar on patronage, but 
declining to apply that exception to respondents in the instant case, including a chief deputy sheriff). 
Also, the dissent commented on the narrow scope of the exception. Id. at 386–87 n.10 (Burger, J., 
dissenting) (“The judgment today is limited to nonpolicymaking positions . . . [I]t is doubtful that 
any significant number of employees can be identified as policymakers in a sheriff’s office. States 
have chosen to provide for the election of many local officials who have little or no genuine 
policymaking functions . . . and the subordinates of such officials are even less likely to have such 
functions. It thus is predictable that the holding today will terminate almost completely the 
contributions of patronage hiring practices to the democratic process.”). 
156. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 
1218 (7th Cir. 1991). 
157. Branti v. Finkel 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 
‘policymaker’ or ‘confidential’ fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring 
authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved.”). 
158. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be difficult to say, under the 
Court’s standard, that ‘partisan’ concerns properly are relevant to the performance of the duties of a 
United States attorney.”). 
159. Opp, 630 F.3d at 622. 
160. See, e.g., Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1996); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 
798, 800 (7th Cir. 1983). 
161. Cutcliffe v. Cochran, 117 F.3d 1353, 1357 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). 
WLR December Galloway FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/8/2011 4:47 PM 
2011] A “NARROW EXCEPTION” RUN AMOK 897 
 
v. Carter,162 the Seventh Circuit withheld age discrimination protection 
from a deputy Indiana state attorney general (“DAG”) based on its 
holding that he was categorically disqualified from patronage protection 
by Elrod and Branti. The court wrote: “if some DAGs can be terminated 
based on their political affiliation, all can be.”163 However, the Eleventh 
Circuit explained that, “Americanos appears to lie in sharp contrast to 
the facts of Branti itself, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
assistant public defenders were protected from patronage dismissal.”164 
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit is resolute in its reliance on patronage 
case law to interpret worker-rights statutes, its skewed application of the 
patronage standards garners different results than did the Court in the 
underlying cases. 
B. Congress Intended a Limited Scope for the Policymaking-Level 
Exception to These Remedial Measures 
Beyond the statutes’ text, legislative history reveals Congress’s intent 
to create a narrow exception for employees at the “policymaking level.” 
When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is proper to turn to the 
statute’s legislative history for guidance as to Congress’s intent.165 
Moreover, if an alternative interpretation clashes with legislative intent 
as reflected in legislative history, courts should adhere to the non-
conflicting interpretation.166 Among legislative history documents, a 
congressional conference report is “recognized as the most reliable 
evidence of congressional intent . . . .”167 
Congress unequivocally indicated its intent was for only narrow 
exceptions to the statutes. A congressional leader told his colleagues 
during the development of the exceptions that the purpose was to 
exclude only “first line advisers” who are “in a close personal . . . [and] 
immediate relationship” with their appointers.168 Also, a congressional 
conference committee report explained: “This exemption is intended to 
                                                     
162. Americanos, 74 F.3d at 138. 
163. Id. at 141 (emphasis added). 
164. Cutcliffe, 74 F.3d at 1357 n.4 (emphasis added). 
165. Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 475 (D. Kan. 1996). The Seventh 
Circuit relied on legislative history and Congressional intent in construing a statute in Graczyk v. 
United Steelworkers of Am., 763 F.2d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1985). 
166. Marcor Dev. Corp. v. United States, 20 Ct. Int’l Trade 538, 543 (1996) (citing Kyocera Int’l, 
Inc. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int’l Trade 91, 96 (1981), aff’d, United States v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 681 
F.2d 796 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
167. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). 
168. 118 CONG. REC. 4492–93 (1972). 
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be construed very narrowly and is in no way intended to establish an 
overall narrowing of the expanded coverage of State and local 
government employees.”169 Ultimately, Congress issued a report 
explaining that it wanted the exceptions “construed narrowly” and 
applied only to cabinet members and such officials at the “highest 
levels” of government.170 
Also, like all civil rights statutes, anti-discrimination statutes warrant 
broad application and only narrow exclusions.171 Courts generally 
construe civil rights laws broadly in light of their remedial purpose.172 
To interpret the “policymaking-level” exception to deny protections to 
workers who enjoy no genuine policy authority dilutes the statutes’ 
significance. The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation abandons broad 
classes of public workers, undermining Congress’s express intent. As 
one scholar observed when Congress expanded federal worker 
protections forty years ago: “it was the clear intention of Congress in 
enacting the 1972 amendments that the scope and effect of Title VII 
should be broadly construed to eliminate employment discrimination.”173 
A federal judge in Oregon said shortly after Congress amended Title VII 
that Congress intended exceptions only for those in “sensitive” or 
“intimate positions,” not, for example, for “large groups of faceless 
technicians and researchers.”174 A broad construction defeats Congress’s 
policy goal in expanding Title VII and the other statutes to exclude a 
                                                     
169. 118 CONG. REC. 7166–67 (1972). 
170. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2180, 1971 WL 11301. 
171. The U.S. Supreme Court has directed that statutory policy objectives should guide statutory 
construction. See Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“It is the duty of this 
court to give effect to the intent of Congress.”); Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355 (1856). 
172. 3B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, § 76:6 (“Courts and commentators now generally 
agree . . . that civil rights acts are remedial and should be liberally construed so their beneficent 
objectives may be realized to the fullest extent possible. To this end, courts apply a broad and 
inclusive understanding of the language in legislation and initiatives to protect and implement civil 
rights . . . . Correlatively, courts strictly construe exceptions and limitations which restrict the 
operation of such laws.”); see also Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic 
Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1984) (“Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
prohibits employment discrimination in the broadest possible terms . . . . Thus, courts have liberally 
interpreted the substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII to ensure the achievement of these 
goals.” (citations omitted)). 
173. Sape, supra note 60, at 857. Note also, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that rules 
exempting some employers from the FLSA, “are to be narrowly construed against the employers 
seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and 
unmistakably within their terms and spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 
(1960) (citations omitted).  
174. Gearhart v. Oregon, 410 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. Or. 1976). 
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relatively small number of workers,175 not sweeping categories of public 
servants. 
C. Any Remaining Ambiguity Is Resolved Under Proper Deference to 
the Narrow Construction Adopted by the EEOC 
The EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing statutes outlawing 
employment discrimination, has construed the “policymaking” exception 
in narrow terms. The U.S. Supreme Court directs courts to defer to that 
agency when evaluating Title VII, holding that “administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great 
deference.”176 The EEOC has unambiguously explained that Congress 
intended the “policymaking-level” exceptions to apply to individuals 
who lead agencies and who “work closely with elected officials and their 
advisors in developing policies that will implement the overall goals of 
the elected officials.”177 Also, the EEOC has explained that Congress 
intended the exceptions to allow elected officials “complete freedom” in 
appointing agency directors to work with them to “develop[ ] policies 
that will implement the overall goals of the elected officials.”178 The 
Seventh Circuit’s rule flatly contradicts this guidance from the EEOC, 
contrary to the Court’s rule of agency deference. 
D.  The Court or Congress Should Clarify that the Policymaking-Level 
Exception Applies Only to Top-Ranking Policy Players 
Either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress must resolve the discord 
over the scope of the policymaking-level exception with a standard that 
honors the language of the workers’ rights laws and reflects Congress’s 
intent that the exception apply to a narrow set of high-ranking public 
                                                     
175. Sape, supra note 60, at 847–48. 
176. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). 
177. EEOC Decision No. 78-42, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6725 (Sept. 29, 1978) (emphasis in 
original); see also EEOC Decision No. 78-33, Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 6718 (June 1, 1978) (“The 
legislative history amply documents the intent of Congress that the exceptions to 701(f) are to be 
construed narrowly.”). 
178. EEOC Decision No. 78-42, at *1 (“In exempting policymaking appointees, Congress 
realized the necessity of allowing elected officials complete freedom in appointing those who would 
direct state and local departments and agencies. These individuals must work closely with elected 
officials and their advisors in developing policies that will implement the overall goals of the 
elected officials. In order to achieve these goals, an elected official is likely to prefer individuals 
with similar political and ideological outlooks. Congress intended to allow elected officials the 
freedom to appoint those with whom they feel they can work best.”). 
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officials (for example, cabinet-level positions).179 
Neither of the circuits that have the most thoroughly-developed 
jurisprudence on the policymaking-level exception offers an appropriate, 
definitive standard. The Seventh Circuit’s broad reading of the 
policymaking exception—labeling as policymakers public employees 
with basic discretion or the ability to offer input—contradicts the 
statutes’ language and Congress’s express intent. It is also at odds with 
the very case law it imports. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit’s (rightly) 
narrower approach is insufficient and vague. That Circuit’s standard—
exempting only employees who “normally would work closely with and 
be accountable to”180 their appointers—is potentially helpful as a 
guideline but falls short of a sufficiently definitive test. Congress was 
clear that its exceptions to the definition of employee in the workers’ 
rights statutes were to be read narrowly and applied only to top-ranking 
employees, such as cabinet members.181 The Second Circuit recognizes 
this limited scope, but lacks a lucid, relevant definition of policymaking-
level exception. Either the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should 
adopt the following three-part framework for evaluating whether an 
appointee falls within the exception to the civil rights laws: (1) does the 
appointee have a sufficiently direct relationship with the appointer?; (2) 
does the appointee establish policy, as opposed to merely advising or 
implementing policy?; and (3) does the appointee’s authority reach to 
substantive policy, beyond procedural or administrative discretion? 
1. To Qualify as a Policymaking-Level Employee Under These 
Statutes, the Appointee Must Have a Direct Relationship with the 
Appointer 
As the statutory language and legislative history reflect, lawmakers 
intended the exception to apply to elected officials’ closest confidants, 
not, for example, to middle managers who set administrative policies on 
bureaucratic matters.182 Therefore, the law should limit the 
policymaking-level exception to appointees holding positions 
characterized by a direct and meaningful relationship with the official 
who appointed them. The Second Circuit rightly evaluated the standard 
                                                     
179. See supra Part III.B.2. 
180. EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
181. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, supra note 170; see also Sape, supra note 60, at 862 (citing 118 
CONG. REC. S3461 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H1694 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972)). 
182. See supra Part. III.B.2. 
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as one of access and accountability to the official.183 Such a position 
would likely be directly supervised by the appointer, but the language 
and history of the statutory definition do not require such a relationship, 
as was implied by the Second Circuit.184 Still, to qualify as 
policymaking-level, the appointee’s position must carry intimacy with 
the appointer on par with those of “immediate advisers” and “personal 
staff” members.185 
2. The Policymaking-Level Exception Should Apply Only to Positions 
that Involve Policy Formulation as a Fundamental Duty 
Before an appointee may be excluded from protections under this 
exemption, an employer should be required to show that the worker held 
the authority and the duty to set policy. This evaluation should rely on 
the inherent characteristics of the job as defined, not necessarily as 
performed by an individual plaintiff.186 The employee must hold power 
to make policy, subject only to the approval of the appointer. The 
purpose of the exception was to exclude only those empowered to enact 
(or obstruct) the politicians’ substantive agenda. For these purposes, an 
appointee would not qualify as serving on the policymaking level if he 
or she advised on policy matters;187 nor if he or she implemented or 
executed policy. Finally, to serve on the policymaking level, 
policymaking must be an essential attribute of the position. 
3. The Policymaking-Level Exception Should Only Apply to Positions 
Influencing Substantive Policy and Should Not Trickle down to 
Administrators or Bureaucrats with Day-to-Day Discretion 
The Seventh Circuit has deemed a sweeping range of public 
employees as policymaking-level appointees—from sheriff deputies188 
to assistant public attorneys189—simply because they enjoy discretion in 
day-to-day dealings. But Congress clearly intended a higher bar for the 
“policy” referred to in the “policymaking-level” exemption. The 
                                                     
183. Butler v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 2000). 
184. See, e.g., Butler, 211 F.3d at 744. 
185. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798. 
186. Cf. Butler, 211 F.3d at 749 (applying the exception to employees whose job descriptions 
carry certain attributes, rather than evaluating based on actual job performance). 
187. Such an appointee might qualify under the separate “immediate adviser” exception. 
188. Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1993); Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 
1218 (7th Cir. 1991). 
189. Opp v. State’s Att’y of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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exception should be limited to employees who create policies that are 
substantive in nature, rather than merely procedural or administrative. 
Exempting those in the latter categories betrays the goal of the 
policymaking exemption because it would exclude administrators as 
well as policymakers. Adopting a narrower interpretation of the 
exemption also ensures appointees are not denied protections based on 
ad hoc or informal advising or because of defendants’ disingenuous 
assertions of the appointee’s authority. 
The U.S. Supreme Court or Congress should follow the lead of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which spelled out what constitutes 
“policymaking” and “policy.”190 In a 1989 age discrimination case, the 
Pennsylvania court noted that the ADEA did not define “policymaking.” 
The court turned to a Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary for 
guidance: 
“Policymaking” may be defined as the act of elaborating 
policy . . . and “policy” is defined as “a definite course or 
method of action selected from among alternatives . . . to guide 
and determine present and future decisions” or “a high-level 
overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable 
procedures especially of a governmental body.”191 
Black’s Law Dictionary offers a similar take; it defines “policy” as: “The 
general principles by which a government is guided in its management 
of public affairs.”192 To foster consistency, federal law should similarly 
define policy and policymaking for the purposes of this exemption. To 
honor Congress’s intent, that definition should clarify that the exception 
applies only to meaningful policy development, not bureaucratic 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts’ inconsistent interpretations of the “policymaking-level” 
exception implicate workers’ rights under several socially ambitious and 
important laws. These laws were intended to establish fundamental civil 
rights, to be denied only under the narrowest of conditions. The statutory 
language related to the policymaking-level exception, the statutes’ 
legislative history, and the interpretation by the EEOC all indicate that 
the exception should be limited in scope. Moreover, there is no policy 
justification for allowing elected officials broad discretion to 
                                                     
190. In re Stout, 559 A.2d 489, 495–96 (Pa. 1989). 
191. Id.  
192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004). 
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discriminate based on race, sex, religion, age, or caregiver status. No 
greater good is served if politicians are given wide room to circumvent 
wage and workplace standards laws. 
Yet confusion and inconsistency have plagued courts dealing with 
public workers’ attempts to assert their rights. These circumstances 
demand a clear framework. To prevent further disharmony with 
Congressional intent, Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court must clarify 
the law to narrowly define the scope of the policymaking exception. If 
we allow officials greater discretion by denying public employees the 
protection of federal civil rights laws, it must be applied only to those 
whom Congress intended. Accordingly, the exception must be limited to 
appointees making substantive policy with meaningful authority and 
legitimately close relationships with their bosses. 
 
